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AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, JUDGE 
JOHN C. BACKLUND 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Appellee's Brief ("State's Brief), the State essentially acknowledges that errors 
were committed in the trial court during the criminal proceedings against Travis Bergstrom 
("Appellant"). However, the State argues either that the errors were harmless or that they 
were waived by Appellant, a pro se defendant who admittedly did not did not have the 
technical know-how to make proper objections and preserve a record for appeal. As 
demonstrated below, the errors were not harmless. Moreover, the fact that the trial court 
1 
failed to conduct the proper inquiry to evaluate Appellant's claim of indigency, which forced 
Appellant to represent himself, is so significant that otherwise harmless errors should still 
result in reversal under the doctrine of cumulative error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT'S "FAILURE" TO ESTABLISH HIS INDIGENCY 
RESULTED FROM THE COURT'S FAILURE TO CONDUCT THE 
STATUTORILY REQUIRED INQUIRY CONCERNING HIS 
FINANCES 
In its Brief, the State argues that Appellant is to blame for failing to present sufficient 
evidence to the Court to establish his indigency. The State argues that: 
Appellant's entire argument regarding the issue of the 
appointment of counsel presumes that appellant was in fact 
indigent when he requested public counsel of the trial court. 
There never was nor has there been, any evidence presented to 
the court to support such a request. 
State's Brief at 5. This argument obviously begs the question. There was no evidence 
presented to the court because the court failed to follow the statutorily mandated procedure 
for obtaining the information necessary to properly evaluate a claim of indigency. 
The State acknowledges that "the court assists defendants in carrying their burden of 
proving indigency by providing an 'Affidavit of Indigency[.]'" State's Brief at 6 (emphasis 
added). Certainly, the court should have assisted the Appellant by providing such an 
affidavit or, at the very least, informing Appellant that such an affidavit is available.1 But that 
1
 The court's failure to inform Appellant of the need for filing the affidavit is 
especially puzzling given that Appellant explicitly asked the court: "How do I go about 
2 
simply didn't happen. There is nothing in the record to indicate Appellant was ever provided 
with such an affidavit or even made aware of it; in fact, the copy of the Affidavit of 
Indigency appended to the State's Brief was not part of the record and should not even be 
considered. Moreover, the fact that the affidavit, which is obviously designed to elicit all of 
the information required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(b), was never provided to 
Appellant establishes that the required inquiry did not take place. 
The State also seems to suggest that indigency determinations are optional and may 
be dispensed with when inconvenient. The State asserts that "[a]t arraignment, when there 
are dozens of people waiting to appear, the court cannot be expected to spend the time 
necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of every defendant's financial situation." State's 
Brief at 6. However, this assertion directly contradicts the requirements of state law. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202 (1995 and 1998 Supp.). To determine indigency, the court 
"shall" consider the following factors: 
(i) the probable expense and burden of defending the case; 
(ii) the ownership of, or any interest in, any tangible or intangible 
personal property or real property, or reasonable expectancy of any such 
interest; 
(iii) the amounts of debts owed by the defendant or that might 
reasonably be incurred by the defendant because of illness or other needs 
within the defendant's family; 
(iv) number, ages, and relationships of any dependents; and 
receiving [a] public defender? I can't afford an attorney." R. at 50 (Tr. at 5-6). If, as the 
State contends, the affidavit is essential to the indigency determination, it would seem to be 
incumbent on the trial court — or perhaps even the prosecutor — to at least inform Appellant 
that he needed to file the affidavit. 
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(v) other relevant factors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-202(b) (emphasis added). Such an analysis is not, as the State 
suggests, optional. State law requires that the trial court conduct such an inquiry of 
Appellant, and the fact that the court did not requires reversal. 
Next, the State, citing State v. Vincent. 883 P.2d 278, 283 (Utah 1994), argues that 
it is Appellant's burden to establish his indigency. State's Brief at 6. Of course, Vincent is 
distinguishable because it was decided prior to the Utah Legislature's addition of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-32-202(b), which imposes more exacting standards on the trial court in making 
indigency determinations. Nonetheless, it is obvious that a defendant claiming indigency 
needs to provide financial information to the court in order for his claim to be properly 
evaluated. But this does not relieve the trial court of the responsibility to make the statutorily 
required inquiry. The court's failure to ask the necessary questions made it impossible for 
Appellant to meet his burden. 
Finally, the State makes the completely irrelevant comment that "appellant is claiming 
that he was indigent on his trial date of June 8, 1998, but was able to retain counsel, who 
made an appearance within sixteen days of appellant's conviction, to assist him with his post-
trial proceedings as well as his appeal." State's Brief at 6-7.2 However, the central issue 
2
 The implication of the State's comment seems to be that if Appellant can afford an 
attorney now, he could afford an attorney for the proceedings before the trial court. 
Although, as already noted, this is an irrelevant point, the record should be clear that 
Appellant is not personally paying for his post-conviction representation. 
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before this Court is not whether Appellant was indigent on June 8, 1998, or whether he is 
indigent now. Rather, the issue is whether the trial court met its obligations under the statute, 
which is designed to provide a trial judge with an adequate factual foundation so that he or 
she can properly rule on a claim of indigency. Indeed, because the trial court failed to 
conduct the required inquiry, it is impossible for this Court to review the trial court's 
"finding" that Appellant was not indigent. Thus, Appellant's claim of indigency was 
improperly denied. 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's conviction should be reversed and the case 
remanded for a new trial, this time following the proper indigency determination. 
II. THE STATE'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENSE WITNESSES 
IMPROPERLY ELICITED CHARACTER EVIDENCE WITHOUT 
PROPER FOUNDATION 
The State improperly cross-examined key defense witnesses by referring to supposed 
"testimony" from witnesses who did not testify and whose supposed "testimony" was 
proffered with little or no foundation. As the State acknowledges in its Brief, at 13, the 
prosecutor was required to have a good faith basis for questions concerning incidents that 
reflected on the character of the Appellant. State's Brief at 13; see also Michelson v. United 
States. 355 U.S. 469 (1948); In the Matter of G.M.P.. 909 S.W.2d 198, 210 (Tex. App. 
1995); State v.David. 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4794, * 15 (1992).3 The State also implicitly 
3
 The State attempts to distinguish some of the other cases cited by Appellant in his 
Opening Brief by pointing out that "none of these cases dealt with the issue of cross-
examination of a witness who had testified regarding the reputation of the accused." State's 
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acknowledges that it had an obligation to at least proffer the factual basis for the question to 
the trial court. Id at 13-14. 
Nonetheless, the State failed to provide an adequate foundation for the highly 
prejudicial "evidence" proffered by the prosecutor. For example, the prosecutor stated at one 
point: "I've got a whole list of people that would be willing to come in and testify that Mr. 
Bergstrom's been stalking them . . . " R. at 59 (Trial Tr. at 29). In fact, the State produced 
two witnesses, only one of whom provided any direct evidence of stalking. R. at 59 (Tr. at 
4-18). Nonetheless, it was against the backdrop of this purported "list" of victims that the 
prosecutor conducted his cross-examination of defense witnesses by referring to anecdotes 
involving alleged misbehavior by the Appellant. During his cross-examination of Scott 
Cutler, for example, the prosecutor referred to four separate anecdotes involving the 
Appellant, without offering any factual bases as to the source of these anecdotes or whether 
there was any reason to believe they actually occurred.4 
Brief at 14 (citing State v. Palmer. 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 
1993); Gayle v. Scully, 779 F.2d 802, 814 (2nd Cir. 1985); White v. State, 448 So. 2d 970, 
972 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). However, the State provides no analysis or explanation as to 
why this distinction is important or even relevant. 
4
 Similarly, during his cross-examination of Appellant, the prosecutor referred to the 
"testimony" of a "branch president or Relief Society president" who would supposedly offer 
testimony that would contradict Appellant's version of events. R at 59 (Tr. at 46). 
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Although essentially acknowledging that it failed to provide the trial court with a 
proper factual basis for almost all of the questions,5 the State now represents to this Court 
that it nonetheless had a good faith basis for the cross-examination. 
The City had spoken with the witnesses in this case as well as 
other people who knew appellant. Each of these people 
confirmed all or part of the incidents about which Cutler was 
cross-examined. The City alluded to this fact when it informed 
the Court that it would be requesting time to confer with its 
witnesses, and did so during the recess. 
State's Brief at 13 (emphasis added). This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, 
the vague "allusion" to a conversation the prosecutor had with unidentified "witnesses" does 
not provide adequate foundation for the alleged anecdotes; nor does it support the reference 
to a "list" of witnesses who would supposedly testify against the Appellant. Second, the 
State acknowledges that the consultation with its "phantom" witnesses provided factual 
support for only one of the four anecdotes to which the prosecutor referred during his cross-
examination of Mr. Cutler. State's Brief at 14. Finally, the prosecutor's "allusion" during 
his closing argument — a reference which obviously came after the damaging statements 
have already been made — does not give the trial judge an opportunity to perform the 
"gatekeeping" function required by Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
5
 The State acknowledges that while it may not have provided a proper factual basis 
during the actual questioning of Scott Cutler, the State proffered support "for at least one of 
the incidents in its summation." State Brief at 14. 
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In short, by amorphously referring to the "list" of witnesses then proceeding to 
question defense witnesses regarding inflammatory and unsubstantiated anecdotes, the 
prosecutor made it seem as though there was a veritable chorus of faceless individuals 
waiting in the wings to denounce the Appellant. This was improper, highly prejudicial and 
constitutes reversible error. 
III. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO RESPOND TO APPELLANT'S TIMELY 
DISCOVERY REQUEST WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
In its Brief, at 8, the State admits that it failed to timely respond to Appellant's 
discovery request. However, the State now argues that its failure to respond was not 
prejudicial because Appellant already knew what evidence the prosecution intended to 
present against him. State's Brief at 10-11. In other words, even though the State ignored 
the Appellant's discovery request, he was not prejudiced because he supposedly could have 
guessed or inferred what the State's evidence against him was going to be. 
This argument fails, largely because it ignores Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)fs requirement 
that the prosecutor "shall" disclose certain information when requested. Additionally, "[t]he 
practice in this state, at least in some districts, is for the prosecutors to make all inculpatory 
evidence available to the defense upon request... Whether prosecutors produce inculpatory 
evidence under court order or on request, they have a duty to comply fully and forthrightly." 
State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994).6 
6
 As the State points out, there are procedural remedies available to a defendant when 
the State fails to respond to a discovery request. See State's Brief at 9-10. However, the 
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In evaluating whether a prosecutor's failure to disclose requested discovery material 
is prejudicial, the defense must carry the initial burden of making a "credible argument that 
the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense." State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 
1987). Then, the burden shifts to the State to "to persuade the court that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome of trial would have been more 
favorable for the defendant." IdL 
Here, Appellant made a clear, concise request for "[a]ll documentation pertaining to 
trial IE. [stet] Police reports, documentation of evidence, etc." and "List and description of 
each document furnished." The request clearly states that the documents are needed "for the 
purpose of preparing a defense . . . " Nonetheless, Appellant received no response to the 
request until after trial. Thus, the only information Appellant had going into the trial was that 
contained in the Information — that he had been charged with the crime of stalking on a 
particular date. R at 1. 
The prosecution's failure to respond to the discovery request impaired the Appellant's 
defense. Without knowing who the prosecutor intended to call as witnesses, the Appellant 
State's argument that there were procedural options available to a trained lawyer who 
understands the rules of procedure and evidence rings somewhat hollow when applied to a 
pro se defendant, especially one who represented himself only out of necessity. As already 
argued in Section I above, Appellant represented himself at trial after he was improperly 
denied appointment of counsel. For that reason, the State's failure to honor the discovery 
request of a pro se litigant, even if deemed harmless in itself, constitutes cumulative error 
when considered in conjunction with other errors, such as the court's failure to conduct a 
proper indigency inquiry. See Section IV below (cumulative error analysis). 
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had no way to properly prepare to rebut the testimony of those witnesses. It is likely, as the 
State suggests in its brief, at 10, that Appellant knew the principal witness against him was 
Ms. Leach. However, the witnesses who were equally damaging to the defense were those 
who never testified directly, but whose testimony was proffered by the prosecution during 
the cross-examination of Mr. Cutler and Appellant. The names of these witnesses, whose 
testimony the prosecutor must have anticipated inasmuch as they were apparently present 
during the trial, would presumably have been disclosed if the prosecutor had responded to 
Appellant's discovery request. With advance warning of the "testimony" from these 
witnesses, Appellant likely would have been able to prepare at least some rebuttal testimony. 
Because the Appellant, per Knight 734 P.2d at 921, has made a "credible argument 
that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense, " the State is required to "to persuade 
the court that there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome of trial 
would have been more favorable for the defendant." Id The State has not and cannot meet 
this burden. Although the State argues that Appellant's witnesses rebutted the testimony of 
Ms. Leach, it is clear from the trial transcript that Appellant was completely unprepared for 
the anecdotal testimony proffered by the prosecutor in his cross-examination of Appellant 
and his witnesses. Accordingly, Appellant's conviction should be reversed and the matter 
remanded for a new trial. 
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IV. APPELLANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED BASED ON 
CUMULATIVE ERROR 
In response to Appellant's argument concerning cumulative error, the State offers only 
a two-sentence rejoinder, which states that there can be no cumulative error because the State 
has refuted all of Appellant's individual claims of error. State's Brief at 15. The State 
fundamentally misunderstands the doctrine of cumulative error. Under the cumulative error 
doctrine, a reviewing court may reverse a conviction when errors that are harmless 
individually are found to be harmful when considered together. See State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 
1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). The State's position as stated in its Brief is not that error was not 
committed, but that any errors were harmless. For instance, the State acknowledges that it 
had an obligation to provide Appellant with the discovery he requested, and that it failed to 
do so. State's Brief at 8. The State also implicitly acknowledges that it had an obligation to 
state the factual basis for the anecdotes about which the prosecutor questioned defense 
witnesses and that it clearly met this burden only with regard to one of the four anecdotes. 
State's Brief at 13-14. These errors, even if assumed to be harmless individually, together 
constitute cumulative error and require reversal, especially when considered in conjunction 




For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's conviction must be reversed and the case 
remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this ^4rt-flay of July, 1999. 
WATKISS & SKORDAS, P.C. 
Gregory G. Sk^rdas 
Brett J. DelPorto 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^k- rkday of July, 1999, two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT were sent by United States first class mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Robert Church, Esq. 
Orem City Attorney's Office 
56 North State Street 
Orem, UT 84058 
Watkiss & SkoWas, PC. 
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